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a. that the delay in moving the case for trial did not present
mitigating circumstances such that remission should be granted ;4"
and
b. that the circumstances of defendant's confinement under
the Mental Hygoiene Law,50 which indicates it does not apply to
those awaiting criminal trial, and his subsequent escape, do not
make out a case for remission, particularly in view of available
provision for commitment to a mental institute in the Code of
Criminal Procedure insuring adequate safeguards against es-
cape.Y' The court further remarked that sureties had more than
adequate time to learn of Fiannaca's mental condition and have
him properly committed by the court, or surrender the principal
and rid themselves of the obligation to prodace him upon trial.2
In a dissenting opinion by Judge Froessel, it was denominated
a "travesty on justice. 3 that the State should collect a "debt" it
created itself by its agents' careless guarding of the defendant who
got away.
It is perhaps noteworthy that neither opinion comments
specifically on the reasons why four years elapsed before the case
was moved for trial, other than to suggest, by way of conjecture,
that the incarceration of Fiannaca's codefendant was the cause. It
may be deemed unfortunate that a surety is subject to such an
elastic expansion of risk where trial is delayed for an inordinate
period of time without requiring the People to produce adequate
circumstances palliative of th6 postponement. Under the express
dictum of the case, in this regard, the surety's only protective
means available is the surrender of his principal whenever the
risk of forfeiture impresses him'as being imminent.
At the Trial
a. Privileged communications: The right to counsel, in-
herent in the concept of a fair trial,5 4 embraces the right to con-
sult counsel in private, -either in the confines of an office or at the
49. CODE CRIer. PROC. § 590 provides for surrender of defendant in exoneration of
bondsman.
50. See note 45 supra: see also People on co,nhlaint of Scheinberg v. McDermott,
179 Misc. 89, 37 N. Y. S. 2d 69 (Magistrate Ct. 1942).
51. CODE CRIM. PROC. §§ 658-662-f provides for an inquiry into sanity of defendant,
before or during trial, or after conviction; an inquiry into ". . . such state of idiocy,
imbecility or insanity that he is incapable of understanding the charge . . . or of making
his defense . . .. " There was no showing that Fiannaca was of such mental abnormality
at the time of his civil commitment.
52. See note 43 supra at 518, 519, 119 N. E. 2d 363, 366.
S3. Id. at 520. 119 N. E. 2d 363, 367.
54. U. S. CONST. AMEND. XIV; People v. McLaughlin, 291 N. Y. 480, 482, 53
N. E. 2d 356, 357 (1943) ; Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U. S. 471, 473 (1945).
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counsel table in court, without the People in a criminal prosecution
intercepting such consultation either openly, by use of force to
effect counsel's divulgence of private information, or covertly, by
planting an eavesdropper or concealed recording mechanism.1
The burden of proving a violation of this particularized right of
privacy, however, must be borne by the defendant; and in seeking
to effectuate his constitutional privilege by achieving redress for
an alleged deprivation thereof, he must clearly establish (1) that
he and his attorney were engaged in professional consultation of
a legal character, (2) that they intended such consultation to be
private and with reasonable circumspection endeavored to pre-
serve the secrecy of their communications, and (3) that either by
open force or secret device, the privacy of their privileged com-
munications was destroyed.68
In People v. Cooper et al.,57 defendants, convicted of murder,
first degree, upon reargument of appeal 8 for the purpose of de-
termining whether the conviction should be reversed on grounds
alleged in support of an application for coram nobis,59 asserted
(inter alia) that their right to counsel and a fair trial had been
impaired by the stationing of a police officer who understood Yid-
dish in proximity to counsel table for the purpose of reporting to
the prosecution Yiddish conversations between defendants and
their attorneys. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence,
adduced in their hearing upon application for the writ, was in-
sufficient to establish a violation of their right in that there was no
showing that the officer overheard anything, that he was stationed
for that purpose, or that even if he had heard anything, it was not
unintentional and excusable as an incidental result of reasonable
and necessary efforts to prevent an attempted escape where a
basis for such suspicion existed.60
In a concurring opinion by Judge Dye and Judge Van Voorhis,
it is pointed out with some force that, for purposes of a practicable
enforcement of the privilege, conversations conducted between
55. Matter of Fusco v. Moses, 304 N. Y. 424, 107 N. E. 2d 581 (1952)
(spy posing as a co-defendant); Coplon v. United States, 191 F. 2d 749 (D. C.
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U. S. 926 (1952), (eavesdropping by telephonic
interception); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932).
56. See RICHARWsoN, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§475-490 (3d ed. 1928).
57. 307 N. Y. 253, 120 N. E. 2d 813 (1954).
58. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 517, 520, N. Y. Laws 1954, c. 806, amendment effective Sep-
tember 1, 1954, permits a defendant to take a direct appeal to the Court of Appeals
from an order of the trial court, made in a capital case, denying a motion for a writ
of error coram nobis.
59. See the discussion of the writ of error coram nobis, origin and limitations in
1 BFLO. L. REv. 268 (1952).
60. E. g., Fusco v. Moses, note 55 supra at 433, 107 N. E. 2d 581, 585; Glasser v.
United States, 315 U. S. 60, 76 (1942). Had defendant's allegations been sufficiently
proved, a new trial would have been required.
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counsel and defendant in a crowded courtroom, even in a foreign
-tongue, should not be cloaked with the protective confidential
status judicially recognized, absent prior objection to the court
that adequate opportunity to confer has been denied during the
trial. The thesis of the concurring opinion flows from the estab-
lished principle that conversations between attorney and client
conducted in the presence of third persons bearing no confidential
relationship are not privileged ;" and since the officer's propinquity
was apparent to defendants, objection thereto should have been
addressed to the court during trial. On this basis, the possibility
of fabricated claims of violation would be obviated, and the prac-
ticability of adjudicating rights on appeal, in this regard, en-
hanced.
b. Co-conspirator's declarations: It has long been held that
declarations of a co-conspirator made subsequent to and not in
furtherance of the conspiratorial enterprise are not admissible in
evidence against another co-conspirator.62  This proposition was
reaffirmed in People v. Marshal 1 where statements to the District
Attorney made by one of two defendants convicted of abortion 4
were read to the jury. Such statements were held by the Court of
Appeals to have been erroneously received in evidence, reversing
the decision of a divided court below."' The court emphasized
that as well as the erroneously denied objection by defendant to
such admission of evidence, the lower court's refusal to instruct
at the time of the admission that the statements of a co-conspirator
after and not in furtherance of the conspiracy were not binding
on the other defendant, and that certain other statements con-
cerning appellant's guilt subsequently expunged from the record
should be completely disregarded by the jury, constituted revers-
ible error.' The unanimous opinion of the court pointed out the
substantial prejudice to defendant occasioned by waiting until the
conclusion of the trial so to instruct, such deferred instruction not
being psychologically the equivalent of a proper instruction con-
temporaneous with the admission.6
61. Doheny v. Lacy, 168 N. Y. 213, 61 N. E. 255 (1901).
62. People v. Ryan, 263 N. Y. 298, 305, 189 N. E. 225, 227 (1934) ; see e. g.,
People v. Vaccaro, 288 N. Y. 170, 42 N. E. 2d 472 (1942) ; People v. Kief, 126 N. Y. 661,
662, 663, 27 N. E. 556, 557 (1891) ; People v. McQuade, 110 N. Y. 284, 307, 18 N. E.
156, 166 (1888).
63. 306 N. Y. 223, 117 N. E. 2d 265 (1954).
64. PENAL LAW § 80.
65. 282 App. Div. 36, 121 N. Y. S. 2d 450 (1st Dep't 1953).
66. See People v. Carborano, 301 N. Y. 39, 92 N. E. 2d 871 (1950) ; People v.
Robinson, 273 N. Y. 438, 8 N. E. 2d 25 (1937) ; see, e. g., People v: Posner, 273 N. Y.
184, 7 N. E. 2d 93 (1937) ; People v. Mleczko, 298 N. Y. 153, 81 N. E. 2d 65 (1948);
People v. Tassiello, 300 N. Y. 425, 91 N. E. 2d 872 (1950).
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The identical question was before the Court in People v.
Ramistella,) where the confession and oral statements of one co-
defendant, definitely implicating appellant and charging him with
another crime, were admitted in evidence over appellant's ob-
jection and exceptions, the trial judge refusing to instruct the jury
at the time of such admission that the statements were not binding
on the co-defendant. The court, in reversing a conviction of
grand larceny, first degree, again underscored the proposition that
a general admonition in the formal charge at the close of the trial
was insufficient to protect appellant from the prejudicial effect of
such evidence.
6 8
The court pointed out further errors basing their refusal, in
that:
a. the right of cross-examination by the defendant was im-
properly impeded by the trial court where the Prosecution offered
evidence to show that the serial number of the stolen car matched
that number stamped in a secret location of the car, which "con-
fidential location" is used by car manufacturers, certain repre-
sentatives of auto theft insurance companies, and police auto
squads, concerning the location of which the trial court prevented
cross-examination ;69 and
bi. that the trial judge permitted the jury to find defendant
guilty on both count one and count three of the indictment, both
of which related to the theft of one automobile, where count one
charged defendant guilty of grand larceny under the special auto-
mobile theft statute, while on count three the jury found defend-
ant guilty under Section 1290 of the Penal Law (so-called common
law larceny). Hence, although defendant was only sentenced once
on the two counts, he was convicted of two separate crimes, only
one of which he could have committed.70
G. Inspection of notes used to refresh witness' recollection: In
People v. Gezzo, n the right of a defendant in a criminal trial to
protect against the introduction of memoranda used to refresh a
witness' recollection, possibly spurious in character, which he is
67. 306 N. Y. 379, 118 N. E. 2d 566 "(1954).
68. See note 66 supra.
69. See, e. g., Alford v. United States, 282 U. S. 687 (1931) ; People v. Becker,
210 N. Y. 274, 104 N. E. 396 (1914); People v. Cole, 43 N. Y. 508 (1871); cf. Friedel
v. Board of Regents of University of New York, 296 N. Y. 347, 73 N. E. 2d 545 (1947).
Concerning the question of the "privileged" character of such information, see Gordon
v. United States, 344 U. S. 414 (1952) ; United States v. Coplon, 185 F. 2d 629, 638
(2d Cir. 1950) ; People v. Schainuck, 286 N. Y. 161, 36 N. E. 2d 94 (1941).
70. See PENAL LAW § 1293-a which is declarative that an act is a crime under this
section only if the circumstances do not constitute larceny under any other section of
art. 122, §§ 1290-1313.
71. 307 N. Y. 385, 121 N. E. 2d 380 (1954).
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not permitted to inspect was reinforced by the Court of Appeals. 2
Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree. It was'
contended on appeal that the refusal of trial court to permit de-
fense counsel to examine notes purportedly made by a police
inspector of a conversation between defendant and the inspector
(at a time when defendant believed he was about to die), which
notes were used to refresh the inspector's recollection while a
witness, was reversible error. The witness had testified that de-
fendant admitted guilt. Reasoning that since the jury might con-
sider defendant's statements as recollected by the witness similar
in nature to a dying man's declarations, 3 and since defendant
asserted self-defense in justification of his admitted shooting of
the deceased, the refusal by the court below of an examination of
the memoranda in question was held to constitute error of a de-
cidedly prejudicial nature, even though such inspection might not
have assisted defendant in any way.
74
A second point discussed by the court and deemed by them
serious error involved the failure by the judge to answer precisely
one of two questions submitted by the jury, while instructing both
defense counsel and the District Attorney under no circumstances
to speak or register an exception to the court's answers. Although
the questions submitted were vague, 6 the court stated emphatical-
ly that it was binding upon the judge to request the questiodirs to
make their inquiry clear, 6 and then to answer proper questions
distinctly and responsively.77 Being a capital case, the Court of
Appeals had the power to order a new trial in the interests of
justice whether or not an exception had been properly stated be-
low.-" Hence, the court declined to determine whether the judge's
instructions to counsel not to speak in the presence of the jury
while requesting instructions constituted, without more, reversible
72. Richardson v. Nassau Elec. RR. Co., 190 App. Div. 529, 180 N. Y. Supp.
109 (2d Dep't 1920); Schwickert v. Levia, 76 App. Div. 373, 78 N. Y. Supp. 394 (2d
Dep't 1902) ; Tibbetts v. Sternberg, 66 Barb. 201 (1870) ; Peck v. Valentine, 94 N. Y.
569, 571 (1884), "... a right of great importance as a protection against fabricated
evidence."
73. See 5 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 1430 (3d ed. 1940).
74. Tibbetts v. Sternberaq, see note 72 supra at 203.
75. The questions submitted were: "Classification of the Penal Law pertaining to
the use of firearms in the case of first and second degree murder; also classification of
first and second degree murder" The trial judge answered by reading §§ 1044, and 1046
of Penal Law defining murder, first degree, and murder, second degree, respectively.
76. CODE CaM. PRoc. §427 reads, in part, "After the jury have retired for de-
liberation . . . if they desire to be informed of a point of law arising in the cause, they
must require the officer to conduct them into court. Upon their being brought into
court, the information required must be given . . .. " People v. Gonzalez, 293 N. Y. 259,
261, 56 N. E. 2d 574, 576 (1944) ; People v. Cooke, 292 N. Y. 185, 193, 54 N. E. 2d 357,
361 (1944).
77. People v. Gonzalez, note 76 supra at 262, 56 N. E. 2d 574, 577.
78. CODE CRIM. PRoc. § 528; see People v. Leyra, 302 N. Y. 353, 365, 98 N. E.
2d 553, 559 (1951) ; People v. Nelson, 189 N. Y. 137, 81 N. E. 768 (1907).
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error as a deprivation of the right of defendant to counsel at
every s.tage of the proceeding.
d. Blood test results: A new section of the Vehicle and
Traffic Law79 caused the Court of Appeals to examine the effect
of the admission in evidence of blood test results where the de-
fendant was convicted of driving while intoxicated8 0
In People v. Ward,8' defendant, who submitted without coer-
cion to the administration of a blood test, the results of which
(clearly indicating prima facie evidence of inebriation)82 were ad-
mitted in evidence at his trial, grounded his appeal on a challenge
to the admissibility of such evidence. Defendant reasoned that
the statute which provided (inter alia) that he might refuse to
submit to such test and have a physician of his own choosing con-
duct the .test in addition to the one given under the direction of
the arresting officer also required that he be specifically apprised
of his rights thereunder at the time of arrest.- The court affirm-
ed the conviction, however, on the ground that since defendant
voluntarily submitted to the test, the statute in question was not
applicable.
8 4
In some cogent dicta, the court indicated that the legislative
intent which supports Section 71-a quite clearly does not purport
to lifit or circumscribe the use of such tests in evidence,85 which
use was never questioned where the tests were given with defend-
ants' consent; and it is further implied, by analogy to the admiss-
ibility of evidence seized illegally without a warrant but with con-
sent,"6 that no requirement of apprising defendant of his right
to refuse is applicable under the circumstance of voluntary sub-
mission. Recognizing, however, that the line between consent and
compulsion when confronted even by an unusually tender and
gentle police officer is diaphanous at best,8" the court recommended
79. VEHICLE AND TaFI'c LAW § 71 (a). Consent to chemical tests, under this
section, is deemed, unless there is an explicit refusal, whenever the police officer, upon
reasonable suspicion, detains a person for driving while intoxicated.
80. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 70 (5).
81. 307 N. Y. 73. 120 N. E. 2d 211 (1954).
82. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 70 (5) (c) indicates that .15% alcoholic con-
tent of blood is regarded as prima facie evidence of intoxication; Defendant's blood test
showed an alcoholic content .183%.
83. See note 79 supra; VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAw § 71 (a) (4).
84. See Ladd and Gibson, The Medical-Legal Aspects of the Blood Test To Deter-
mine Intoxication, 24 IowA L. REv. 191, 245-251 (1939) ; cf. Matter of Schutt v. MacDuff,
205 Misc. 45, 51-52, 127 N. Y. S. 2d 116, 125, 126 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
85. See Interim Report of New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Motor
Vchicle Problems. Chemical Tests for Intoxication, N. Y. LEa. Doc. no. 25, p. 15-17,
35 (1953).
86. 8 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2184-a (3d ed. 1940) ; see also United States v. Wit-
hams, 161 F. 2d 835 (2d Cir. 1947).
87. See Ladd and Gibson, op. cit. supra note 84 at 245-251.
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that better practice on the part of the police would call for notifi-
cation to defendant of his rights under section 71-a whenever there
may be a charge of coercion.
e. Circurstantiat evidence: Frequently in criminal cases a
difficult area of analysis and sometimes conjecture arises in regard
to the legal sufficiency of the quality of the proof required to con-
vict when such proof consists, in major part, of circumstantial
evidence. In the absence of direct proof in a criminal trial that
the particular defendant committed the particular act charged,
can the proof of a chain of circumstances or occurrences relating
to the crime, in which the defendant was principally involved, be
utilized to secure a conviction "beyond reasonable doubt" of such
defendant for that crime ?"8
The Court of Appeals affirmatively answered this question in
People v. Harris,s9 defining once again the proper qualifications
applicable to the use and sufficiency of circumstantial evidence up-
on the basis of which a conviction is obtainable. In the instant
case, defendant was convicted of murder, first degree committed
during the commission, or attempt to comrmit, rape. In a ques-
tion and answer statement, not consistent in all particulars with
defendant's trial testimony, he told the assistant prosecutor that
he had been with decedent on the morning of her death and had
had intercourse with her at the place where she was later found
dead, that a tussle preceded their sexual congress, and that after-
wards she "couldn't move." Decedent died of strangulation, and
the torn condition of her unddrclothing indicated a sexual assault.
Inasmuch as an autopsy showed that decedent's system had ab-
sorbed an amount of alcohol sufficient to cause "staggering", and
defendant as well as another witness testified that he and decedent
had been drinldng together just prior to the time of the homicide,
the charge of the trial court authorizing the jury to find either
rape by force or fear, or because of intoxication preventing resist-
ance was justified." Such admissions of the defendant, which
were in no way confessions of guilt, together with other evidence
from which actions of guilt were inferable, satisfied the court that
the New York test of sufficiency of proof was complied with. The
established test, which the court recapitulated, is that "the proven
facts must exclude to a moral certainty every hypothesis except
that of guilt or of the offense charged and not alone must all the
88. See 1 VIGmoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 25, 26, 38, 43, 41 (3d ed. 1940) ; see also WIG-
.ioRE, The Science of Judicial Proof §§ 9-15 (3d ed. 1937).
89. 306 N. Y. 345, 118 N. E. 2d 470 (1954), affirming 282 App. Div. 156, 121 N. Y.
S. 2d 868 (1st Dep't 1953).
90. See PENAL LAW § 2010.
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proven facts be consistent with and point to guilt, but they must
be inconsistent with innocence." '91
A second argument by the defendant, that it was error for the
court below to include in its charge the common law theory of
homicide as well as felony murder, was denied by the court since
there was nothing to indicate that such inclusion confused the
jury or prejudiced the defendant.
The court was presented with another facet of the problem
of evaluating circumstantial evidence in the light of standards of
sufficiency of proof to convict, in People v. Foley.92
Defendants' conviction of the crimes of burglary, third de-
gree and larceny, second degree, were predicated upon their
alleged recent, conscious and exclusive possession of the fruits of
those crimes.9 3  The Appellate Division reversed the convictions
on the law for the reason that the alleged possession was not es-
tablished by direct evidence, but found its basis in circumstantial
evidence alone9 4 The infirmity arising from such an application
of circumstantial evidence is that an inference of guilt is support-
ed by an inference of possession. In a per curiam opinion the
Court of Appeals affirmed the reversal,. but disagreed with the
Appellate Division on the question of the propriety of establishing
conscious and exclusive possession of the fruits of the crimes, stat-
ing that such proof is proper and sufficient where the clear and
convincing evidence establishes circumstances which exclude to a
moral certainty every other inference but that of exclusive posses-
sion of the stolen goods by defendants. Because the circumstantial
evidence did not, in the instant case, meet the test of certainty ex-
pounded, the convictions were reversed, and a new trial granted.
Chief Judge Lewis and Judge Fuld dissented on the ground
that the proof satisfied the proper standards of certainty 5
f. Force permissible to prevent illegal arrest: That an arrest
without a warrant in certain limited fact situations has been au-
thorized96 is beyond dispute. But an arrest without a warrant
91. People v. Weiss, 290 N. Y. 160, 163, 48 N. E. 2d 306, 307 (1943) ; People v.
Taddio, 292 N. Y. 488, 489, 55 N. E. 2d 749 (1944) ; Shepherd v. People, 19 N. Y. 537,
545 (1859).
92. 307 N. Y. 490, 121 N. E. 2d 516 (1954).
93. Knickerbocker v. People, 43 N. Y. 177, 179-180 (1870).
94. See note 91 supra.
95. Cf. People v. May, 290 N. Y. 369, 375, 49 N. E. 2d 486, 489 (1943) ; People
v. Woltering, 270 N. Y. 51, 61, 9 N. E. 2d 774, 777 (1937).
96. CODE Caim. PRoc. § 177 provides for arrest without warrant for a crime com-
mitted or attempted in the presence of the officer, or where the person arrested has com-
mitted a felony, although not in the officer's presence; or where a felony has in fact
been committed, and the arresting officer had reasonable cause for believing the person
arrested to have committed the felony.
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which is not effected within the legally circumscribed area of pro-
priety, whereby the arrest becomes illegal, endows the victim with
a right to resist-by using reasonably sufficient force to prevent the
offense against his person.
7
People v. Cherry8 involved a concededly illegal arrest by
police officers, one of whom was attacked by the victim biting his
thumb in an effort to avoid such arrest. The Appellate Division,
affirming a finding by the court below that defendant was guilty
of assault, third degree,9 in that he employed more force than
was necessary or sufficient- to prevent the offense committed upon
him, was reversed by the Court of Appeals. The majority opinion
by Judge Fuld was to the effect that since the officers were guilty
of an illegal arrest,' and the defendant was thereby empowered
to use sufficient force to prevent that improper detention,10 1 de-
fendant's bite did not constitute an assault, either as a revengeful
counter-attack, or vindictive infliction of needless injury, regard-
less of the fact that the officers displayed their badges before mak-
ing such arrest.
The dissenting opinion by Judge Desmond, in which Judge
Froessel concurred, is based on the premise that since the court
below found that defendant did use more force than was necessary
for the purpose, which finding was affirmed by the Appellate Divi-
sion, the latter authorized to pass on facts unlike the Court of
Appeals, a reversal would be justified only if as a matter of law
the defendant did not use more force than was reasonably neces-
sary under the circumstances.'0 2
After Trial
a. Legality of Judgment-Habeas corpus: Does the omission
of a direction by the trial court for the enforcement of paymenL
of a fine, which fine was a part of an original sentence including
imprisonment, render the judgment on which the sentence is im-
posed defective? This question was presented to the Court of
Appeals in People ex rel. Sedotto v. Jackson,0 where the relator,
who had been convicted of perjury, first degree, 0 4 instituted habeas
97. PENAL LAw § 246.
98. 307 N. Y. 308, 121 N. E. 2d 238 (1954).
99. 282 App. Div. 948, 125 N. Y. S. 2d 654 (2d Dep't 1953).
100. See note 96 su~ra.
101. See note 98 supra at 310, 121 N. E. 2d 238, 239.
102. Id., at 315-317, 121 N. E. 2d 238, 243; see, e. g., People v. Murray, 54 Hun
406, 7 N. Y. Supp. 548 (1889) ; Magar v. Hammond, 183 N. Y. 387, 390, 76 N. E. 474,
475 (1906).
103. 307 N. Y. 291, 121 N. E. 2d 229 (1954).
104. PENAL LAW § 1633 (1) provides the punishment for perjury, first degree:
"Perjury in the first degree and subornation of perjury in the first degree are felonies
and are punishable by imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or by a fine
of not more than $5,000, or by both."
